Scoping Evaluation

Evaluation of the Division of Parole and Probation

Department of Legislative Services
Office of Program Evaluation and Government Accountability
Annapolis, Maryland

October 2020
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October 9, 2020

The Honorable Clarence K. Lam, M.D., Senate Chair, Joint Audit and Evaluation Committee
The Honorable Carol L. Krimm, House Chair, Joint Audit and Evaluation Committee
Members of the Joint Audit and Evaluation Committee

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We have conducted a program evaluation of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) – Division of Parole and Probation (DPP). This is a scoping evaluation, the primary purpose of which is to determine whether the unit should undergo a more comprehensive evaluation. Our recommendation is to do so at the appropriate time.

This evaluation was initiated at the request of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, who asked us to answer three questions:

1. Of all the victims and suspects of murders and nonfatal shootings in Baltimore City between January 1, 2020, and February 29, 2020, how many were being supervised by DPP at the time they were involved in the murder and/or nonfatal shooting?

2. Of those who were under DPP supervision, at what level did they comply with the conditions of their supervision and what, if any, DPP follow up was in place; and how did their compliance compare with individuals under a similar level of supervision who were not known to be involved in murder and/or nonfatal shooting?

3. What, if any, after-action review has been undertaken by DPP to evaluate the quality of their supervision of individuals involved in murder and/or nonfatal shooting?

In answering these questions, we have made four observations and four recommendations. The departmental response to the evaluation is included as Appendix C.

We wish to acknowledge the extraordinary cooperation extended to us by DPSCS – DPP during this evaluation, which was conducted during the COVID-19 State of Emergency.

Respectfully submitted,

Michael Powell
Director

MP/mpd
In January and February of 2020, 177 people were involved in murders and/or nonfatal shootings in Baltimore, as either a victim or a suspect.

Forty-five percent of murder victims were being supervised by DPP when they were murdered.

Thirty-seven percent (66 of 177) of all victims and suspects were under DPP supervision.

There were noticeable differences in the compliance rate of several general supervision conditions when comparing supervisees involved in murders or nonfatal shootings to a control group.

DPP failed to follow their own after-action policy in a majority of the cases involving murder victims and suspects observed during this scoping evaluation.
OPEGA Recommendations

1. DPP should explore the value of developing a process that assesses the risk of a supervisee being a victim of a murder, nonfatal shooting, or other violent crime.

2. The Maryland General Assembly should enact legislation requiring DPP to institute a fatality review process for those individuals murdered while under their supervision.

3. DPP should document and store supervisee compliance data in a structured way. This compliance data should be used by agents and managers to identify compliance issues in real time and allow the data to be used in risk assessments that help predict recidivism and victimization.

4. Regulations should be established that mandate after-action review for those incidents where an individual under DPP supervision is involved in a murder or nonfatal shooting. Furthermore, DPP should report annually to the Maryland General Assembly on the findings of their after-action policy.
# Contents

Letter of Transmittal ........................................................................................................ iii

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................... v

Scope and Purpose ........................................................................................................... 1

Background ....................................................................................................................... 3

Observations and Recommendations ............................................................................... 12

  Focus Question 1 ........................................................................................................ 12
    Observation 1 ........................................................................................................... 12
    Recommendation 1 ................................................................................................. 13
    Observation 2 ........................................................................................................... 14
    Recommendation 2 ................................................................................................. 15

  Focus Question 2 ........................................................................................................ 15
    Observation 3 ........................................................................................................... 15
    Recommendation 3 ................................................................................................. 19

  Focus Question 3 ........................................................................................................ 20
    Observation 4 ........................................................................................................... 20
    Recommendation 4 ................................................................................................. 21

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 23

Appendix A – Recommended Legislation ..................................................................... 25

Appendix B – Scoping Evaluation Letter from Presiding Officers ............................... 31

Appendix C – Response from Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services .. 35
Scope and Purpose

Pursuant to § 2-1234(a)(3)(ii) of the State Government Article, at the request of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Delegates, the Executive Director of the Department of Legislative Services (DLS) requested that the Office of Program Evaluation and Government Accountability (OPEGA) undertake a scoping evaluation of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services’ (DPSCS) Division of Parole and Probation (DPP). The request was submitted in response to the Maryland General Assembly’s bipartisan concern over violent crime and the role of DPP. Specifically, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Delegates requested answers to the following questions:

1. Of all victims and suspects of murders and nonfatal shootings in Baltimore City between January 1, 2020, and February 29, 2020, how many were being supervised by DPP at the time they were involved in the murder and/or nonfatal shooting?

2. Of those who were under DPP supervision, at what level did they comply with the conditions of their supervision and what, if any, DPP follow up was in place; and how did their compliance compare with individuals under a similar level of supervision who were not known to be involved in murder and/or nonfatal shooting?

3. What, if any, after-action review has been undertaken by DPP to evaluate the quality of their supervision of individuals involved in murder and/or nonfatal shooting?

For this report, OPEGA attempts to answer these questions through the analysis of data obtained from the following sources:

- Baltimore Police Department:
  - Names of suspects and victims of homicide or nonfatal shootings between January 1, 2020 and February 29, 2020.
  - Interviews with supervising officers
  - Historical crime data (homicides over the past 10 years)

- Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services
  - Offender Case Management System (OCMS) database
  - Interviews with DPSCS/DPP staff
  - Review of various training manuals and presentation materials
  - General orders provided by DPP

- Published reports:
  - Division of Parole and Probation Regional and National Caseload Report
  - FY20 Budget Book Volume II: Public Safety and Correctional Services
It is important to note that this is a scoping evaluation. Pursuant to § 2-1234(c)(1) of the State Government Article, a scoping evaluation is specifically performed to determine whether the unit, in this case DPP, should undergo a more comprehensive performance evaluation. This determination shall be made by answering a specified question or questions about a particular program to gain insight into an area of legislative interest. A full evaluation would focus on the components listed in § 2-1235 of the State Government Article.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the majority of communication, research, and collaboration among all participants was done remotely.
Background

Division of Parole and Probation

DPP is the community supervision portion of DPSCS. As such, DPP works closely with other criminal justice and community-based entities to fulfill their key objective of reducing the number of supervisees who reoffend while under supervision. In furtherance of this mission, some of DPP’s responsibilities include supervising offenders on parole, probation, and mandatory release, conducting pre-sentence investigations, and overseeing Marylanders who have been court ordered into the Drinking Driver Monitor Program.¹

This scoping evaluation specifically reviewed people who were being supervised by means of parole, probation, and mandatory release as show in Exhibit 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Projected # of Cases FY 2020¹</th>
<th>% of Total Cases Projected FY 2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parole</td>
<td>Where an offender is released from a correctional facility under a written order for parole.</td>
<td>7,173</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probation</td>
<td>Judicially ordered conditional release of an individual from the execution or imposition of all or part of a term of incarceration, usually with the individual subject to divisional supervision or monitoring. This includes probation before judgment, which means a stay of the entering of a guilty judgement by a court, followed by the placing of the defendant on probation.</td>
<td>81,430</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory Release</td>
<td>Conditional release from confinement that is based upon diminution credits, as stipulated by the legislature and earned by an inmate.</td>
<td>6,564</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ This background section is not intended to be a comprehensive overview of all DPP duties and responsibilities.
² Projected data comes from DPSCS Managing for Results report, which estimates community supervision caseloads based on caseloads of prior year.
The Justice Reinvestment Act

In 2016, the Maryland General Assembly passed the Justice Reinvestment Act (JRA) (Chapter 515 of 2016), which implemented many of the recommendations from the final report by the Justice Reinvestment Coordinating Council (JRCC). JRCC, a group of inter-branch, bipartisan, criminal justice stakeholders, was tasked with developing “a statewide framework of sentencing and corrections policies to further reduce the state’s incarcerated population, reduce spending on corrections, and reinvest in strategies to increase public safety and reduce recidivism...”

Two JRA outcomes of particular note to this report which impacted DPP supervision practices were the requirement for a validated screening process and the development of a graduated sanctions matrix:

1. Validated Screening Tool and Risk and Needs Assessment

DPP within DPSCS must administer a validated screening tool on each individual on parole or mandatory supervision. DPP must also administer a risk and needs assessment and develop an individualized case plan for each individual who has been screened as moderate or high risk to reoffend. DPP must supervise the individual based on the results of the validated screening tool or the assessment.

2. Graduated Sanctions for Violations of Parole and Probation

DPSCS must establish a program to implement the use of “graduated sanctions” in response to “technical violations” of conditions of supervision and adopt policies and procedures to implement the program and ensure that specified due process protections and supervisory guidelines are in place. DPP must provide notice to the court and the Maryland Parole Commission (MPC) regarding a technical violation and any graduated sanctions imposed as a result. The court and MPC may impose specified maximum sentences for a revocation due to a “technical violation” but may depart from the limits if adhering to the limits would create a risk to public safety or to a victim or witness. The court may also depart from the specified limits if the court commits the probationer or defendant to Maryland Department of Health (MDH) under § 8-507 of the Health-General Article for substance abuse treatment as an alternative to incarceration.

“Technical violation” means a violation of a condition of probation, parole, or mandatory supervision that does not involve an arrest or a summons issued by a District Court Commissioner on a statement of charges filed by a law enforcement officer, a violation of a criminal prohibition other than a minor traffic offense, a violation of a no-contact or stay-away order, or “absconding.” “Absconding” means willfully evading supervision. “Absconding” does not include missing a single appointment with a supervising authority.

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3 Justice Reinvestment Coordinating Council Final Report (December 2015)
DPP Intake and Screening Process

In accordance with the JRA under § 6-104(a)(1)(i–iii) of the Correctional Services Article, DPP shall administer a validated screening tool on each person under supervision along with a risk and needs assessment, and supervise the person based on the results. The assessment process performed by DPP agents is shown in Exhibit 2.

The Violence Prevention Initiative (VPI) screener consists of three questions designed to determine whether enhanced supervision consistent with the VPI is necessary. Those questions are:

1. Is the individual under the age of 30?
2. Is the current underlying offense any of the following:
   - 1\textsuperscript{st} degree murder, 2\textsuperscript{nd} degree murder, accessory to murder, kidnapping, robbery with a deadly weapon, 1\textsuperscript{st} degree assault, carjacking, handgun violation in use with the commission of a crime, handgun violation (possession), manslaughter (excluding involuntary & vehicular), possession of a firearm with a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) distribution, felon in possession of a firearm, regulated firearm possession, disarming officer, CDS distribution, possession with intent to distribute CDS, volume CDS dealer, or drug kingpin
   - The offenses listed above include attempts and conspiracy

\footnote{Chapter 5, Section 4 of the DPP Operations Manual shows a slightly different flow chart representation of the Assessment Process; however, DPP has confirmed that Exhibit 2 is more representative of the current process.}
3. Are there seven or more lifetime arrests (not convictions), including juvenile?

If the answers to all three VPI screener questions are “Yes”, then the person is to be placed in the VPI level of supervision. If any of the answers to the VPI screener are “No”, then the individual moves on to the Initial Screener.

The initial screening instrument, called the Initial Screener or Screener, must be completed within 10 days of intake. It is composed of three questions designed to determine the risk posed by the person who will be under supervision. Each answer receives a numerical score that is totaled to determine whether a supplemental risk and needs assessment shall be administered. The questions in the Initial Screener are:

1. What is the individual’s current age?
2. Whether the individual has a current or prior weapons charge?
3. What is the individual’s arrest history?

An individual who scores a 0 to 2 on the Initial Screener is placed in a “Low” category of supervision, where a score of 3 or more uses the Levels of Service Inventory – Revised (LSI-R) to further determine the individual’s supervision level.

The LSI-R is an approximately 30 to 60 minute semi-structured interview where a DPP agent asks a series of questions to ascertain the individual’s needs and likelihood of recidivism. The questions cover a wide variety of categories to give an in-depth look into the specifics of the prospective supervision case at hand. After receiving a LSI-R score based on the answers to the examination, and pursuant to the potential necessity to conduct the VPI screener, supervisees are categorized into one of five different levels of supervision. (See Exhibit 3).
### Exhibit 3
Levels of Supervision

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supervision Level</th>
<th>Eligibility Tool Used</th>
<th>Contact Standards (Minimum)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| VPI               | VPI Screener          | • Two in person meetings monthly  
|                   |                       | • Monthly home visit       
|                   |                       | • Positive home verification within 20 days of intake or change of residence  
|                   |                       | • Monthly field contact  
|                   |                       | • Monthly verification of special conditions and employment  
|                   |                       | • Telephone and kiosk contacts as needed  |
| High              | LSI-R                 | • Two in-person meetings monthly  
|                   |                       | • Monthly home visit       
|                   |                       | • Positive home verification within 20 days of intake or change of residence  
|                   |                       | • Monthly field contact  
|                   |                       | • Monthly verification of special conditions and employment  
|                   |                       | • Telephone and kiosk contacts as needed  |
| Moderate          | LSI-R                 | • Home verification within 20 days of intake or change of residence  
|                   |                       | • Monthly in-person meetings  
|                   |                       | • Monthly verification of special conditions and employment  
|                   |                       | • Field, telephone, and kiosk contacts as needed  |
| Low/Moderate      | LSI-R                 | • Home verification within 20 days of intake by documentation and within 20 days of being notified that the address of record has changed.  
|                   |                       | • Monthly in-person, kiosk, or telephone contact  
|                   |                       | • Monthly verification of special conditions  
|                   |                       | • Employment verification as needed  |
| Low               | Initial Risk Screener or LSI-R | • Home verification within 20 days of intake by documentation and within 20 days of being notified that the address of record has changed.  
|                   |                       | • In-person, kiosk, or telephone contact based on behavior and noncompliance  
|                   |                       | • Monthly verification of special conditions  
|                   |                       | • Employment verification as needed  |
Although not listed in Exhibit 3, a supervisee may be assigned the status of “Review” as their supervision level. This would be the case for those individuals who have yet to receive an initial designated level, as DPP agents have 45 days to complete the LSI-R and/or VPI screeners from the intake date if necessary. Those individuals listed as under “Review” are supervised as if they are under the “High” supervision status.

At present time, VPI shares most, if not all, of the same supervision guidelines as that of “High” supervision. However, it is important to note that VPI, unlike other supervision levels, does not depend on an LSI-R score. In practice, VPI is a fast track to the highest level of supervision and a way to identify a group of people who have a high risk of reoffending even if the more intensive LSI-R suggests that a lower level of supervision would be acceptable.

The JRA stipulates that the risk screener itself shall be revalidated every three years. The risk screener is due for revalidation in 2020.

**Supervision and Compliance**

DPP states that the main goal of supervision is to reduce recidivism through the application of evidence-based practices to facilitate positive change. This is accomplished by (1) establishing a rapport with the person under supervision; (2) assessing the supervisee’s criminogenic factors and triggers; (3) developing and (when needed) modifying a supervision plan; and (4) using both subtle and overt incentives and sanctions to guide the client toward positive change.

In general, the conditions of supervision are directed by court order. Although a variety of supervision criteria may exist depending on the specifics of the underlying case, general conditions of supervision may include that the supervisee:

- report as directed and follow (their) supervising agents lawful instructions;
- work and/or attend school regularly as directed and provide verification to (their) supervising agent;
- get permission from (their) supervising agent before changing (their) home address, changing (their) job, and/or leaving the state of Maryland;
- obey all laws;
- notify (their) supervising agent at once if charged with a criminal offense, including jailable traffic offenses;
- get permission from the court before owning, possessing, using, or having under (their) control any dangerous weapon or firearm of any description;
- permit (their) supervising agent to visit (their) home;
- do not illegally possess, use, or sell any narcotic drug, controlled substance, counterfeit substance, or related paraphernalia;
- appear in court when notified to do so; and

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5 Included in DPP’s Conditions of Supervision PowerPoint presentation updated 04.2019
pay all fines, costs, restitution, and fees as ordered by the court or as directed by (their) supervising agent through a payment schedule.

In addition to general conditions of supervision, it may be ordered that a person also adhere to special conditions of supervision, which may include such stipulations as the supervisee:

- submit to alcohol or drug testing;
- attend self-help group meetings;
- complete community service;
- have no contact with a specified person;
- do not enter or be found near a specified place; and
- participate in a one of several community based programs.

DPP agents are responsible for maintaining accurate and up to date case notes in OCMS and advising the sentencing authority of any new charges or noncompliance in an ongoing effort to assist the supervisee to develop a crime-free lifestyle. If there is a violation of supervision conditions, DPP agents look to the graduated interventions sanctions matrix for guidance. Described above in the JRA section of this report, the matrix breaks down infraction severity across the supervision levels and gives examples of potential interventions and sanctions that could be administered. While the matrix is followed in the majority of instances, Chapter 7, Section 10 of the DPP manual, which deals with violence prevention supervision, recognizes that there are situations where noncompliant behavior by a high-risk individual require responses that deviate from options provided by the matrix.

When supervision efforts fail and a supervisee is thought to pose a risk to public safety, the acting supervision agent may request a warrant for a violation hearing. A report is prepared for the court where the presiding judge will determine the best course of action moving forward.

**DPP in Baltimore City**

DPP has multiple offices in Baltimore City. As of January 1, 2020, there are 143 DPP agents who oversee approximately 9,345 cases. As a frame of reference, the U.S. Census Bureau estimates Baltimore City’s total population to be 593,490 as of July 1, 2019. That means that approximately 1.6% of Baltimore City’s population is under DPP supervision. For a full breakdown of the cases by supervision level, please see Exhibit 4.

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6 Data pertaining to sex offenders was excluded, as this report did not involve the supervision of anyone registered as a sex offender.

7 As of January 1, 2020, DPP supervises an additional 527 cases involving sex offenders, most of which are supervised by the Balt. City SO 06 office which employs 16 additional agents.
### Exhibit 4
#### DPP Baltimore City Offices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>VPI</th>
<th>HGH</th>
<th>MOD</th>
<th>LMD</th>
<th>LOW</th>
<th>REV</th>
<th>UNK</th>
<th>Total Cases</th>
<th>Total Agents</th>
<th>Caseload Avg.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balt City VPI 84</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTC Circuit 03</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTC District 02</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast East 29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast West 28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gay St. 10</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,255</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Supv 23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison St. SE 31</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,558</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reentry 15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seton 20</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,098</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severn St. 21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment Liaison 25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>533</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>2,881</td>
<td>2,276</td>
<td>1,851</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9,345</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In fiscal 2018, DPP reported that the statewide average caseload per agent was 81.4, just under the national average of 82. DPSCS indicates that Baltimore City has more active supervision cases than any other jurisdiction in Maryland; however, its overall caseload average is approximately 20% lower than the state and national averages. Specialized case load offices such as Treatment Liaison Office 25 and Baltimore City VPI 84 have caseloads half as large as the Baltimore City average, primarily due to the increased demand required of DPP agents in these specialized areas of supervision.

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8 Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services: Division of Parole and Probation Regional and National Caseload Report. (November 2019).
Observations and Recommendations

**Focus Question 1:** Of all victims and suspects of murders and nonfatal shootings in Baltimore City between January 1, 2020, and February 29, 2020, how many were being supervised by DPP at the time they were involved in the murder and/or nonfatal shooting?

**Observation 1:** Thirty-seven percent of people that were victims of, or suspects in, murders or nonfatal shootings in Baltimore City between January 1, 2020, and February 29, 2020, were actively under DPP supervision.

The Baltimore Police Department (BPD) provided OPEGA with several lists of people who were associated with incidents that occurred between January 1, 2020, and February 29, 2020. Those lists included murder suspects, murder victims, nonfatal shooting suspects, and nonfatal shooting victims. Suspects are people who were charged during that window of time for an act that may have occurred at any time prior, whereas victims are people who were the victim of a murder or nonfatal shooting that occurred during our observation window. It is important to note that suspects are individuals that have been charged with a crime but have not been adjudicated as guilty or innocent.

The lists combined to show 179 incidents across the two-month observation period. OPEGA was granted remote access to DPP’s OCMS to investigate which of the names associated with the 179 incidents were under DPP supervision when the incident occurred. It was discovered that 67 of the 179 incidents (or 37%) involved people with an open case. Exhibit 5 shows the breakdown of people who were not supervised by DPP versus those who were across the various incident categories.

**Exhibit 5**  
**Baltimore Murders and Nonfatal Shootings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Supervised by DPP</th>
<th>Not Supervised by DPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder Victims</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder Suspects</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting Victims</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting Suspects</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When investigating individuals involved in those incidents, it should be noted that there were two duplicate names that occurred. Two people were involved in multiple incidents; one person was both a shooting suspect and a murder suspect, while the other was both a shooting suspect and later a murder victim. For purposes of analyzing the underlying names of the incidents reported by BPD, there were 177 people involved in incidents during our observation window, 66 (37%) of whom were under DPP supervision.

While 66 individuals had an open case in the OCMS database, 4 of these were unsupervised cases. An unsupervised case is one in which a sentencing court specified that the case is to be unsupervised and the role of DPP is to complete some form of record check which may include determining whether an offender is complying with a special condition, reporting a new criminal charge or conviction incurred by the offender, or monitoring payment obligations that are payable through DPP. If these unsupervised cases are not considered, then the overall percentage drops to 35%.

**Recommendation 1: DPP should explore the value of developing a process that assesses the risk of a supervisee being a victim of a murder, nonfatal shooting, or other violent crime.**

The screening and risk assessment tools required by the JRA, which are currently being utilized by DPP, focus on identifying a supervisee’s underlying issues for offending and assessing the risk that the particular supervisee has for reoffending during their time under supervision. By identifying individuals with a higher risk of reoffending, DPP can look to deter this action through enhanced supervision tactics and case management. The end result is a higher number of individuals who successfully complete their supervision requirements without committing a new crime, thereby reducing the recidivism rate.

DPP should explore using this same logic to develop a process that quantifies the risk a supervisee has of being the victim of a murder, nonfatal shooting, or other violent crime. As shown in Observation 1, 37% of the people who were involved in a murder or nonfatal shooting in Baltimore City between January 1, 2020, and February 29, 2020, were under DPP supervision. Current screening and assessment practices look to diminish the number of individuals under supervision who reoffend, but were not designed to reduce victimization. DPP supervisees made up 52 of the 136 individuals who were victims of either a murder of nonfatal shooting during the observation window. In order to diminish the number of supervisees who are victims, DPP should see if they can determine whether or not similarities exist among victims who were under supervision, and the effect various supervision interventions had on the circumstances surrounding the murder, nonfatal shooting, or other violent crime. DPP would need to answer two specific questions in their exploration:

1. Are there identifiable characteristics that can be statistically shown to predict the likelihood that a supervisee will become a victim of a murder, nonfatal shooting, or other violent crime?; and if so,
2. Are there aspects of DPP supervision that can be utilized to decrease this likelihood?
This recommendation does not suggest that punitive actions should be taken against those individuals who are potentially more susceptible to being the victim of a murder, nonfatal shooting, or other violent crime. Rather, these individuals may require DPP agents to engage in enhanced interventions with a stronger emphasis on the various needs of the individual identified during the LSI-R process. A process that looks to assess the likelihood of victimization could potentially save lives and allow DPP to further the DPSCS mission to protect “the public, its employees, and detainees and offenders under its supervision”.

Observation 2: Forty-five percent of all murder victims identified by BPD between January 1, 2020, and February 29, 2020, were actively under DPP supervision, while only 1.6% of Baltimore City’s population is under supervision.

BPD identified 51 murder victims between January 1, 2020, and February 29, 2020. That two-month total was the second highest to begin a year among the last 10 years, trailing only 2017, which saw 32 murders reported in the month of January alone. The vast majority of the murders that occurred during the observation window are attributed to shootings. Of those 51 murder victims, 23 (45%), were being supervised by DPP at the time they were killed. One of those 23 people was an unsupervised case. As previously noted, an unsupervised case is one where a sentencing court specified that the case is to be unsupervised and the role of DPP is to complete some form of record check. If this case were excluded, then the percentage of murder victims would drop to 43%.

Exhibit 6
Baltimore Murder Victims between January 1, 2020 and February 29, 2020

As mentioned in the background section of this report, approximately 1.6% of Baltimore City’s population is under the supervision of DPP; it is significant that individuals under supervision account for 45% of all murder victims in Baltimore City during our observation window.
Recommendation 2: The Maryland General Assembly should enact legislation requiring DPP to institute a fatality review process for those individuals murdered while under their supervision.

The data discovered in this scoping evaluation suggests that individuals under DPP supervision in Baltimore City are an identifiable vulnerable population, susceptible to falling victim to murder at a disproportionate rate compared to individuals not under DPP supervision. (see Exhibit 7)

Exhibit 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Population (Approx.)</th>
<th>% of Population</th>
<th>Victim of Murder (1/1/20 to 2/29/20)</th>
<th>Ratio: Victim to Population (Per 1,000 individuals)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under DPP Supervision</td>
<td>9,345</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Under DPP Supervision</td>
<td>584,145</td>
<td>98.4%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DPP should institute a more thorough review process to understand the circumstances surrounding supervisees involved in murder and recommend changes to policies, practices, and programs that might reduce the frequency of these incidents.

The review process by DPP could also include external stakeholders and individuals with expertise, which might include local and/or State law enforcement, the Division of Corrections, the Maryland Parole Commission, and community partners, among others. In each case review, DPP should identify the circumstances and background that led to the murder (including all contributing factors) and provide a detailed explanation of recommended changes. A summary of the recommended changes, including a status report on implementing the recommendations, should be provided annually to the Maryland General Assembly. Proposed legislation is included as Appendix A.

Focus Question 2: Of those who were under DPP supervision, at what level did they comply with the conditions of their supervision and what, if any, DPP follow up was in place; and how did their compliance compare with individuals under a similar level of supervision who were not known to be involved in murder and/or nonfatal shooting?

Observation 3: There were noticeable differences in the compliance rate of several general supervision conditions when comparing supervisees involved in murders or nonfatal shootings to supervisees not involved in murders or nonfatal shootings.
OPEGA conducted an observational analysis of supervision orders and case notes for the 66 DPP supervisees who were identified as victims or suspects of murder or a nonfatal shooting between January 1, 2020, and February 29, 2020, and compared those observations to a group of 66 DPP supervisees who were under supervision in the same timeframe but were not involved in a murder or nonfatal shooting. This was done to ascertain whether there were any noticeable differences in the level of compliance across various supervision conditions exhibited by the two groups.

Both groups contained 66 individuals, with the following breakdown of supervision levels for the supervisees involved: VPI (14); High (2); Moderate (5); Low-Moderate (26); Low (8); and Review (11).

The process for randomly selecting the group who were not involved in a murder or nonfatal shooting was carried out with the help of DSPCS’ Office of Data Development in the following manner:

- Identify potential names within our observation window: 15,561 names of people who were supervised by one of the Baltimore offices between January 1, 2020, and February 29, 2020.

- Scale down: The 15,561 names were scaled down to 7 lists comprised of 60 randomized names for each of the various supervision levels (60 VPI, 60 High, 60 Moderate, 60 Low-Moderate, 60 Low, and 60 Review) along with an additional list of 60 names who had an active case but are unsupervised (record check only).

- Match the group of supervisees involved in a murder or a nonfatal shooting: From the various lists, random names were pulled to match the supervision levels of those supervisees involved in a murder or nonfatal shooting, giving a final random sample group of 66 individuals.

OPEGA reviewed the case notes and supervision orders for both groups of 66 (132 total individuals) in DPP OCMS and noted when there was an indication that a supervisee failed to strictly meet the supervision conditions listed in the order. For example, if a supervisee was required to “Report as Directed” to their supervising agent, OPEGA looked to see if each supervisee with this condition reported as directed, or if instead there were instances where the supervisee failed to report.

Due to the amount of supervision conditions, the amount of case notes for each supervisee, and the length of time that each individual was under supervision, compliance is subjective and not easily tracked on a real-time basis. As shown in Exhibit 8, OPEGA developed a subjective scale specifically to assist in tracking real-time compliance observations during the case note review.

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9 DPP has a measure of compliance at case closure, where an unsatisfactorily closed case may be due to a revocation of probation or the issuance of a warrant.
### Exhibit 8

**Subjective Compliance Scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Compliance</th>
<th>Symbol Used</th>
<th>Description of Compliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strict Compliance</td>
<td>“C”</td>
<td>Case notes indicated that the supervisee was in strict compliance with the condition of supervision, or in some instances, there were no case notes that indicated that there was a lack of compliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted Compliance</td>
<td>“AC”</td>
<td>Case notes indicated that there may have been some act that may not have strictly complied, but there were accompanying case notes that indicated the supervisee was actively trying to comply or to rectify the noncompliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Not Comply</td>
<td>“DNC”</td>
<td>Case notes indicated that the supervisee did not comply with the corresponding supervision requirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>“NA”</td>
<td>Unclear as to whether or not strict compliance existed based on the case notes, or, in some instances, the supervision requirement did not apply to the particular supervisee.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An example of the process that OPEGA utilized to measure compliance with conditions of supervision under the subjective scale for two individuals, across three general conditions of supervision\(^\text{10}\), is shown in Exhibit 9 and described thereafter.

### Exhibit 9

**Compliance Analysis Examples**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID #</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Supervision Level</th>
<th>Conditions of Supervision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Report as Directed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0057</td>
<td>Homicide Victim</td>
<td>Low-Moderate</td>
<td>AC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0034</td>
<td>Homicide Victim</td>
<td>Low-Moderate</td>
<td>DNC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Individual #0057 Explained**

The case notes on the individual identified here as #0057 showed they received multiple failure to report notes in their OCMS case file; however, it was later discovered that these reporting dates were missed due to illness and subsequent hospitalization due to a kidney disease. This warranted an “attempted compliance” for the “report as directed” supervision condition.

\(^\text{10}\) A broader list of general supervision conditions and special conditions can be found in the background section of this report.
Furthermore, this individual was on disability, which may have compromised their ability to meet the requirement for work/school, so “not applicable” was entered. Finally, the individual was arrested for theft while under supervision and received a “did not comply” for the condition of “obey all laws.”

**Individual # 0034 Explained**

The case notes on the individual identified here as #0034 showed multiple failure to report notes with no accompanying reason for the missed appointments, thereby receiving a designation of “did not comply” for the “report as directed” condition. The case notes also indicated that the individual began supervision unemployed, found employment, but then lost employment at approximately the same time that they were arrested on an assault charge. After the assault charge, the individual then found employment again. The intermittent employment was identified as “attempted compliance” for the work/school condition, while the assault charge earned a designation of “did not comply” for the condition of “obey all laws.”

The general supervision categories of “report as directed,” “obey all laws,” and “work and/or attend school regularly as directed” were singled out as a basis of comparison due to the high volume of case notes regarding these conditions. The limited sample size used for this observational analysis along with the subjectivity of compliance as a whole should be considered when reviewing the final conclusions. At the same time, a comparison of the two groups with respect to these supervision conditions shows that those individuals who were not involved in a murder or nonfatal shooting exhibited a noticeably higher percentage of positive compliance as seen in **Exhibit 10**. Positive compliance is considered to be either a “C” or “AC” based on the subjective scale.

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**Exhibit 10**

**Positive Compliance Comparison**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Victims/Suspects</th>
<th>Control Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Report as Directed</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obey All Laws</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work/School</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A more in-depth breakdown of the compliance review can be seen in Exhibit 11, which compares the supervision conditions of “report as directed,” “obey all laws,” and “work and/or attend school regularly as directed” for the two observation groups.

**Exhibit 11**
**Compliance Observations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supervision Condition</th>
<th>Victims/Suspects</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work/School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obey All Laws</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report as Directed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recommendation 3: DPP should document and store supervisee compliance data in a structured way. This compliance data should be used by agents and managers to identify compliance issues in real time and allow the data to be used in risk assessments that help predict recidivism and victimization.

The overall efficiency and effectiveness of the OCMS database was not considered as a main objective in answering the focus questions for this scoping evaluation; however, generalizations can be made regarding the use of OCMS to store and use compliance data.

While the analysis of compliance was limited and somewhat subjective, it suggests that a supervisee’s compliance might be a meaningful factor in understanding their risk of involvement in a serious violent crime. And if it is meaningful, it might be important to have an objective understanding of compliance in real time at a management level so that DPP agents can intervene in cases where the compliance data suggests that a supervisee might be at high risk of reoffending and/or being involved in a serious violent crime.

At the present time, it would be difficult to use compliance data for analysis, reporting, or management because it is captured and stored in OCMS primarily as a narrative case note. OCMS has some capability for capturing compliance data in a structured way. For example, there are
various “quick action buttons” that automate and flag compliance issues like “failure to report.” Additionally, check-in kiosks are used to automate supervisee’s answers to questions of compliance, such as if they are currently employed.

Case notes should continue to be documented and utilized by all DPP staff, while structured compliance data should be useful for DPP supervisors. Instead of having to review case notes for hundreds of supervisees, they could run a report that showed which supervisees were struggling with compliance and ask the appropriate agents to intervene. DPP reviewed the supervision of one murder victim (“individual #0022”) and found that their LSI-R had not been scheduled, the substance abuse testing policy was not followed, and that the supervisee had failed to report for four of their past five office visits. Supervisors should be able to receive this type of information in real time for the caseloads of all of the agents they supervise.

**Focus Question 3:** What, if any, after-action review has been undertaken by DPP to evaluate the quality of their supervision of individuals involved in murder and/or nonfatal shootings?

**Observation 4:** DPP failed to follow their own after-action policy in a majority of the cases involving murder victims and suspects observed during this scoping evaluation.

DPSCS General Order No. 09–006 (the Order), effective November 4, 2009, and most recently revised February 14, 2012, establishes the role of an Intelligence Unit Liaison (IUL) and lays out a notification and follow-up procedure for relaying information pertaining to certain violent incidents involving individuals supervised by DPP. An IUL is a DPP employee who is assigned to work within a law enforcement agency and tasked with gathering and sharing certain intelligence regarding offenders.

The Order specifies that notification may occur when the IUL determines that an offender being supervised by DPP is a shooting victim, homicide victim, or is charged with or identified as a suspect in a homicide, nonfatal shooting, robbery, rape, police-involved shooting, or any crime involving the offender’s use of a firearm. Once a DPP field agent receives a notification from an IUL, they have one workday to complete a Critical Incident Tracking Template (CITT), used to document basic incident information, and add it to the appropriate supervision notes within OCMS.

Further follow up is required by the Order in the form of a Critical Incident Analysis (CIA) for situations where the offender is either identified by an IUL as a murder suspect or victim, or where the preparation of a CIA is required by the Director or Executive Deputy Director. The CIA involves a case file review between the assigned agent and their supervisor and must be completed within 10 workdays following the requirement or request of a CITT and inserted into the appropriate supervision notes within OCMS.

According to the Order, all 66 of the DPP supervisees who were identified as victims or suspects of murder or a nonfatal shooting between January 1, 2020, and February 29, 2020 should have a CITT completed in their OCMS case notes. An analysis of those case notes showed that 59 of the 66 individuals (89%) had a CITT located in the corresponding supervision notes that referenced the underlying murder or nonfatal shooting incident. Furthermore, all homicide
suspects and victims should have had a CIA completed within 10 workdays of the CITT. Of these 32 individuals, 4 (13%) had a CIA completed within the 10-workday window. Six (19%) had a CIA entered sometime after the 10-workday window. Twenty-two (69%) did not have a CIA in OCMS case notes. (It should be noted that a number of cases in OCMS that did not have the required CIA appear to have had some type of review or closeout note, but without the full analysis included in a CIA.)

Exhibit 12
CIAs for Murder Victims and Suspects

Recommendation 4: Regulations should be established that mandate after-action review for those incidents where an individual under DPP supervision is involved in a murder or nonfatal shooting. Furthermore, DPP should report annually to the Maryland General Assembly on the findings of their after-action policy.

After-action review is generally accepted as a simple, yet powerful, tool that allows organizations to assess performance and learn from both success and failure. DPSCS General Order #09-006 already creates a framework to evaluate the quality of supervision for people involved in murder and/or nonfatal shootings; however, as shown in Exhibit 12, there is not strict adherence to the protocol laid out by the Order. Furthermore, at present time, there is no evidence that the information gathered from the CITT and CIA process is used to shape DPP policies or procedures. That said, DPP supervisory staff did indicate during our interview process that after-action review of case information is helpful, especially as an educational tool for DPP agents.

DPSCS should establish regulations that mandate the process, scope, usage, and reporting requirements of after-action review for incidents involving an individual under DPP supervision who is involved, either as a suspect or victim, in a murder or nonfatal shooting. The regulations would be codified in the Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR), making the process transparent to the public. Data obtained from the after-action review process should be utilized to positively influence changes to DPP supervision policy and procedures. Information specifically gained from the after-action review of murder victims can be used in the fatality review process.
discussed in Recommendation 2 of this report. DPP should be required to report annually to the Maryland General Assembly on the number of supervisees involved in the various incidents, the percentage of incidents in which after-action protocol was conducted, any recommendations resulting from the after-action process, and the status of implementing those recommendations.
Conclusion

The following table summarizes the observations and recommendations identified during this scoping evaluation of the DPSCS DPP.

**DPP Scoping Evaluation Observations and Recommendations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus Question</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Thirty-seven percent of people that were victims of, or suspects in, murders or nonfatal shootings in Baltimore City between January 1, 2020, and February 29, 2020, were actively under DPP supervision.</td>
<td>DPP should explore the value of developing a process that assesses the risk of a supervisee being a victim of a murder, nonfatal shooting, or other violent crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forty-five percent of all murder victims identified by BPD between January 1, 2020, and February 29, 2020, were actively under DPP supervision, while only 1.6% of Baltimore City’s population is under supervision.</td>
<td>The Maryland General Assembly should enact legislation requiring DPP to institute a fatality review process for those individuals murdered while under their supervision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>There were noticeable differences in the compliance rate of several general supervision conditions when comparing supervisees involved in murders or nonfatal shootings to supervisees not involved in murders or nonfatal shootings.</td>
<td>DPP should document and store supervisee compliance data in a structured way. This compliance data should be used by agents and managers to identify compliance issues in real time and allow the data to be used in risk assessments that help predict recidivism and victimization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>DPP failed to follow their own after-action policy in a majority of the cases involving murder victims and suspects observed during this scoping evaluation.</td>
<td>Regulations should be established that mandate after-action review for those incidents where an individual under DPP supervision is involved in a murder or nonfatal shooting. Furthermore, DPP should report annually to the Maryland General Assembly on the findings of their after-action policy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on this scoping evaluation, in addition to the recommendations listed herein, OPEGA would further recommend that a full program evaluation be conducted pursuant to MD Code Annotated, State Government § 2-1235. The full evaluation would provide a comprehensive
look at DPP and not be limited to the Baltimore area. Some areas that might be scrutinized could include:

- the efficiency and effectiveness of OCMS;
- the use and value of electronic monitoring;
- the effectiveness of pre-sentence investigation;
- the ability of the current risk assessment tool to accurately and consistently identify the needs of individuals under supervision;
- the ability of DPP agents to meet the individual needs of supervisees given current resources;
- the effectiveness of graduated sanctions;
- the use and value of enhanced supervision and collaboration between DPP and relevant public safety agencies with respect to individuals convicted or charged with violent crimes; and
- the compliance of supervisees, best practices to improve compliance, and the efficacy of reporting technical violations.
A BILL ENTITLED

AN ACT concerning

Division of Parole and Probation – Duties – Murders Involving Offenders Under Supervision

FOR the purpose of expanding the duties of the Division of Parole and Probation to include the examination and review of murders involving offenders under the supervision of the Division for a certain purpose; and generally relating to the duties of the Division of Parole and Probation.

BY repealing and reenacting, with amendments,

   Article - Correctional Services
   Section 6-104(a)
   Annotated Code of Maryland
   (2017 Replacement Volume and 2020 Supplement)

SECTION 1. BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND, That the Laws of Maryland read as follows:

Article – Correctional Services

6–104.

   (a) Subject to the authority of the Secretary and in addition to any other duties established by law, the Division:

   (1) shall:
(i) administer a validated screening tool on each individual on parole or mandatory supervision under the supervision of the Division;

(ii) administer a risk and needs assessment and develop an individualized case plan for each individual on parole or mandatory supervision who has been screened as moderate or high risk to reoffend;

(iii) supervise an individual on parole or mandatory supervision based on the results of a validated screening tool or risk and needs assessment conducted under items (i) or (ii) of this item;

(iv) supervise an individual under mandatory supervision until the expiration of the individual’s maximum term or terms of confinement;

(v) regularly inform the Commission of the activities of offenders who are supervised by the Division, including, if requested by the Commission, any graduated sanctions imposed under § 6–121 of this subtitle;

(vi) issue a warrant for the retaking of an offender charged with a violation of a condition of parole or mandatory supervision, if this authority is delegated by the Commission to the Director of the Division; [and]

(vii) administer the Drinking Driver Monitor Program, collect supervision fees, and adopt guidelines for collecting the monthly program fee assessed in accordance with § 6–115 of this subtitle; and

(VIII) EXAMINE AND REVIEW MURDERS INVOLVING OFFENDERS WHO ARE SUPERVISED BY THE DIVISION FOR THE PURPOSE OF ADVISING THE SECRETARY ON POLICIES AND PROGRAMS TO PREVENT SUCH MURDERS, INCLUDING:

1. A MURDER COMMITTED BY AN OFFENDER UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE DIVISION, IF THE OFFENDER IS CONVICTED; AND

2. THE MURDER OF AN OFFENDER UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE DIVISION; AND

(2) may recommend:

(i) that the Commission modify any condition of parole or mandatory supervision; and
(ii) that the Commission issue a warrant for the retaking of an offender.

SECTION 2. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That this Act shall take effect October 1, 2021.
Ms. Victoria L. Gruber, Esq.
Executive Director, Department of Legislative Services
90 State Circle
Annapolis, MD 21401

Dear Ms. Gruber:

Given the Maryland General Assembly’s bi-partisan concern over violent crime, and the urgency of the issue, we ask that you consider directing your Office of Program Evaluation and Government Accountability (OPEGA) to conduct a scoping evaluation of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services’ Division of Parole and Probation (DPP). Specifically, we ask that OPEGA attempt to answer the following questions:

1. Of all victims and suspects of murders and non-fatal shootings in Baltimore City between 1/1/20 and 2/29/20, how many were being supervised by DPP at the time they were involved in the murder and/or non-fatal shooting?

2. Of those who were under DPP supervision, at what level did they comply with the conditions of their supervision and what, if any, DPP follow up was in place; and how did their compliance compare with individuals under a similar level of supervision who were not known to be involved in murder and/or non-fatal shooting?

3. What, if any, after-action review has been undertaken by DPP to evaluate the quality of their supervision of individuals involved in murder and/or non-fatal shooting?

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

William C. Ferguson, IV
President of the Senate

Adrienne A. Jones
Speaker of the House
Appendix C– Response from Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services
October 8, 2020

Mr. Michael Powell, Director
Office of Program Evaluation and Government Accountability (OPEGA)
Department of Legislative Services
90 State Circle
Annapolis, Maryland 21401

Dear Mr. Powell,

The Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services has reviewed the OPEGA-DPP Final Report dated October 2020. Thank you for the observations and recommendations that were made as the result of this evaluation. We appreciate this overview; however, the observations and recommendations present an overly simplified and very narrow look at an extremely complex criminal justice and public safety system. Please find attached the Department’s itemized responses to the observations and recommendations included in the report, and some additional comments pertaining to different sections of the report.

I want to take this opportunity to emphasize how proud I am of the incredible work being performed every day by the Department’s Parole and Probation Agents. Their efforts often go unnoticed. In addition, it should be noted that the partnerships the Department has established with other agencies, such as Baltimore City, the Maryland Department of Health, and numerous community organizations, continue to enhance DPP’s efforts.

If you have any questions regarding this response, please contact me.

Sincerely,

Robert L. Green
Secretary

Attachments
copy: Walter Pete Landon, Deputy Chief of Staff
Observation 1: Thirty-seven percent of people that were victims of, or suspects in, murders or non-fatal shootings in Baltimore City between 1/1/20 and 2/29/20 were actively under DPP supervision.

Response: The Department agrees in part and disagrees in part.

After a review of the 66 cases identified by OPEGA that were victims or suspects from January 1, 2020 through February 29, 2020 in Baltimore City, we determined that there were 65 cases where the event occurred between the time period identified in the study. One case was accidentally identified as January 30, 2020, when the incident was actually December 30, 2019. A review of the case notes reveals that on December 30, 2019, the CIT template was initiated and entered into the Offender Case Management System (OCMS) the same day by the Intelligence Unit Liaison. The CIT was subsequently completed and entered by the field on the same date. This particular case thus falls outside of the scope of the audit as it occurred prior to the months reviewed.

Recommendation 1: DPP should explore the value of developing a process that assesses the risk of a supervisee being a victim of a murder, non-fatal shooting, or other violent crime.

Response: The Department disagrees.

This statement assumes that because of their criminal justice involvement, clients are at a high risk to be a victim, which is not necessarily supported by the data reviewed. The majority of victims of nonfatal shootings and homicides were not under supervision. The Department does not offer comment on the causality of victimization within its supervision population, and does not consider the case closures by death to be a mark of noncompliance, as that would assign criminal culpability to victims for a perpetrator’s behavior. To single out victims who are under community supervision and to attribute their victimization more to their behavior compared to other victims of violent crimes is inappropriate. The existing validated risk screening tool takes prior victimization into account for both risk of recidivism and client needs. As this tool has already been validated on the supervision population, the Department does not see a benefit to exploring victim-specific screeners designed for use by service providers. The overlap between DPP’s population and a minority of shooting and homicide victims is reflective of similarities in the demographics of these groups.

One of the core components of supervision is the utilization of evidence-based techniques to promote accountability in its clients for their behavior. The Division’s
public safety professionals are always making appropriate referrals for services for individuals under supervision to improve their lives. If a victimization specific screener were added as an additional step to the existing hour long screener, it would run the serious risk of adding additional elements to supervision regardless of whether the touchpoint of supervision were the most effective or appropriate intervention. Assigning additional conditions of supervision or heightening supervision based on screening for possible victimization can only place an additional unwarranted burden on justice-involved victims. This runs counter to this basic and necessary step to reducing recidivism, and it is assigning responsibility for preventing crimes on victims. To decrease the likelihood of victimization, additional victim service providers, and educational, community and employment services should be readily available to all individuals in need, and the Division already engages in partnerships with 141 community organizations and programs in Baltimore City to meet its clients needs. The methodology with which existing state, local and community social services programs prioritize aid is within their purview, and the Department does not oppose the use of victimization screeners in the provision of their services. However, it is wholly inappropriate to incorporate enhanced scrutiny or conditions of supervision within a framework that is by its nature punitive. At its core, the Justice Reinvestment Act’s (JRA) provisions and implementation were geared toward directing criminal justice resources toward preventing recidivism and eliminating pathways to reincarceration born of superfluous justice involvement. It is in the service of these goals that DPP revised its screening tools to remove unnecessary considerations unrelated to dynamic indicators of recidivism, which previously resulted in over estimating the supervision needs of clients. Placing clients under additional conditions or subjecting them to additional contacts unrelated to their risk of offense is demonstrated to have an adverse effect on recidivism reduction. The Department has faithfully implemented the Levels of Service Inventory–Revised (LSI-R) screener and is in full agreement with the State’s move towards more evidence-based criminal justice decision-making, which has led to improved outcomes in the other 32 JRI states. The current screener is comprehensive and already addresses the criminogenic risks and needs that are most impactful on behavior. The Department looks forward to the existing revalidation timeline to critically evaluate any additional improvements that can be made in the screener methodology, staff training, and intervention efficacy.

The very data reviewed by OPEGA and national trends are sufficient to suggest that adopting a screener targeting victims within a criminal justice framework would disproportionately impact young, black, economically disenfranchised men in Baltimore City. The Department advises that a victim of crime should not be singled out differently if they are on community supervision beyond the existing identification of needs and supports related to their overall supervision success. DPP provides training and support to ensure that the work done by its agents is trauma informed. Any burden of effort, either real or perceived, placed on supervision clients because of their victimization, could have a chilling effect on the candor of self-reporting, which is a cornerstone of effective supervision. As supervisees have inherent rights to make lifestyle decisions within the bounds of the law, the Division cannot regulate where an individual can reside or work. For an agent to suggest that a client leave
their home or place of employment because of a location’s link to their potential victimization is not feasible or appropriate.

**Observation 2:** Forty-five percent of all murder victims identified by BPD between 1/1/20 and 2/29/20 were actively under DPP supervision, while only 1.6% of Baltimore City’s population is under supervision.

**Response:** The Department agrees in part and disagrees in part.

The percentage of Baltimore City’s population under supervision is largely in line with national figures on community supervision. The Bureau of Justice Statistics produces annual reports on nationwide trends in parole and probation, which is decreasing in usage. As of 2018, the most recent year reported, the national rate of community supervision was 1.3% of the U.S. population. However, utilizing the comparison of 1.6% of individuals under community supervision as a comparison point against the subset of homicide victims is extremely misleading due to the sharp difference in scale and focus. The Department does not offer comment on the causality of victimization within its supervision population, and does not consider case closures by death to be a mark of noncompliance, as that would assign criminal culpability to victims for a perpetrator’s behavior. If the purpose of this comparison is to identify whether the resources provided by the Department were substantively linked to victimization, then a comparison with the percentage of victims engaged with other social services that have a demonstrated impact on mortality reduction, such as healthcare access, would be a far more appropriate framework for this recommendation than the general population.

The Department’s purview is limited to the criminal justice involved population, which is entirely absent in this observation’s analysis. DPP operations are designed to reduce existing criminogenic risks, and as such are expected to result in fewer re-offenses. Using the data in question, 34% of identified homicide suspects in this period were under supervision, compared to 43% of victims who were under supervision. This is a disparity of 9%, which is far more prudent than the 42% difference presented in this observation. However, there is an important difference in the reasonable expectation of difference between these groups, in that the DPP actively employs interventions to reduce re-offense. Thus, the Department would expect the involvement of supervised individuals to be lower in the sample of homicide suspects than the sample of homicide victims, as the behavior of the former was actively targeted. There is nothing in this observation to suggest that the DPP’s involvement with a minority of the homicide victims in the reviewed period warrants a DPP-based intervention.

There are other sampling biases at work in the creation of a correlation between victims and the supervision population. The Center for Victim Research conducted research on who experiences violent victimization and who accesses services (see linked study here). The following is indicated for individuals having a propensity to be victimized - “overall, the risk is highest among persons who are younger, male,
black, living in the poorest households and living in urban areas.” There are significant overlaps within this profile and the population of individuals under supervision. In light of this existing mirroring of trends, it is even more unreasonable to compare the 43% under supervision at the time of their murder to the overall population of Baltimore City rather than, at minimum, the proportion of homicide suspects under supervision, and the proportion of young black men under supervision in Baltimore City given the overlaps in these two profiles. The overlap between the demographics of victimization and the demographics of the justice involved-population does not indicate that the structure or tools of the criminal justice system are suited for health-focused interventions. It is well documented that criminal justice involved populations are often economically marginalized and experience health disparities more than other population cohorts. It is reasonable to assume that the same population targeted for scrutiny in this report are also a group that merits prioritized intervention from other local and community-based actors. In a post justice reform landscape, it is especially necessary to leverage all state and local entities to identify the best partners for intervention, not the most convenient.

**Recommendation 2: The Maryland General Assembly should enact legislation requiring DPP to institute a fatality review process for those individuals murdered while under their supervision.**

**Response:** The Department agrees in part and disagrees in part.

The existence of fatality review teams is an important epidemiological and prevention tool, widely in use in Maryland under the guidance of the Maryland Department of Health (MDH). DPP already actively partners with many local health departments in these activities. A thorough review would be fine under certain circumstances, but DPP should not be the lead agency responsible for this. It is both inappropriate and inefficient to establish this process outside of the existing statutory framework within the MDH. In order to remain prevention and intervention focused, it is important that these teams are interdisciplinary and led from a healthcare authority. Common outcomes from these groups include quantitative and qualitative analyses of effective touchpoints, and the identification of multiple agencies with frequent contact. Homicide and non-fatal shooting suspect cases are involved in active prosecutions. Due to the sensitivity of the information involved in those cases, key circumstances leading up to the event may not be able to be shared widely, especially with non-criminal justice agencies. In order to enact a process such as this, the proposed group would need to mimic the existing fatality review structure within MDH as much as possible, to include the State’s Attorney’s Office.

Internally, the appropriate focus for DPP is those clients whose behavior led to homicide. A Critical Incident Analysis (CIA) process in DPP includes a thorough review of the supervision of these cases, involving homicides and non-fatal shootings. We have additionally required supervisors to hold formal case staffings when these incidents occur. The case staffing is a formal discussion into the supervision of a case to find out strengths and weaknesses in supervision.
Observation 3: There were noticeable differences in the compliance rate of several general supervision conditions when comparing supervisees involved in murders or non-fatal shootings to supervisees not involved in murders or non-fatal shootings.

Response: The Department disagrees.

Comparison of clients who may have different profiles makes this type of review challenging. Reviewing cases at a supervision level is reflective of their current risk level, which does not account for specific patterns in their criminal history, which have proven to be an important factor in evaluating recidivism risk. The LSI-R reviews the circumstances of a supervised client’s life, and assigning a score that falls within a classification scoring range does not indicate that those clients are the same. Different clients within the same supervision level may have markedly different habits, needs, and reentry barriers. They may therefore require different levels of intervention/supervision, although they may be classified the same. For example, Client A and Client B both scored as moderate risk individuals. Client A has a stable family, with a high school diploma, and is employed, but is different from Client B, who may have a less stable home situation, has not completed his/her formal education, and is sporadically employed. Additionally, the conditions of supervision imposed at sentencing may be different. That makes each offender within a classification unique on their own merits.

The 56 individuals under supervision that are discussed above, represent 0.38% of all Baltimore City supervision clients monitored during that period. There were 14,972 individuals supervised in Baltimore City over the first two months of 2020. The supervision population in Baltimore City represented 18% of the open cases statewide over this period of time.

Most cases are in compliance, both in Baltimore City and statewide. The overwhelming majority (92%) of individuals supervised across Maryland were compliant with the terms of their supervision over this period of time, with only 8% of cases being noncompliant. Similarly, the majority (86%) of individuals supervised in Baltimore City were compliant with the terms of their supervision over the same period of time. Only 14% of cases were noncompliant, which encompasses cases closed unsatisfactorily, revocations, and those open cases where an individual has an open warrant issued.

Cases with open warrants are the majority of noncompliant cases in the community. This last category is the largest factor in noncompliant cases, and also indicates cases where an individual is at large in the community in noncompliant status. Open and pending warrants account for 73% of noncompliant cases in Baltimore City over this period, compared to 67% of noncompliant cases in Maryland statewide. Warrants assigned by the District Court are served by the Baltimore City Police Department, while Circuit Court warrants are served by the Sheriff's Office. While DPP does not
have warrant execution powers, the Department’s Warrant Apprehension Unit focuses on high priority parole warrants.

**Recommendation 3:** DPP should document and store supervisee compliance data in a structured way. This compliance data should be used by agents and managers to identify compliance issues in real time, and allow the data to be used in risk assessments that help predict recidivism and victimization.

**Response:** The Department agrees in part and disagrees in part.

DPP is always striving to have well documented case notes. It is important to have well written case notes, since from time to time clients are transferred to other agents. When another agent receives the case, they can review the notes and have a good understanding of the individual that they are supervising. To force the uniform categorization of compliance beyond the existing process within the graduated sanctions matrix would be to undo the deliberate creation of discretion achieved under the JRA. DPP staff underwent significant training in dynamic risk assessment, as well as appropriately weighing when to find a client in violation of supervision terms sufficient to warrant revocation. In the *Probation and Parole Officers Discretionary Decision-Making Response to Technical and Criminal Violations* by Mark Jones and John Kerbs, they make it clear that discretionary decisions need to be made by parole and probation agents, social workers and teachers, identified as street level bureaucrats, by stating: “discretion allows for the consideration of idiosyncrasies that help actors select an outcome that is appropriate given the unique circumstances”. This permits the agent to treat their clients as individuals; reformatting case notes to remove freestyle note taking would be a grave injustice to the client and to the agency, particularly when the Division strives to encourage well-written and informed case note entries. One can simply not shortcut the importance of a case note to make it easier for a reviewer to glance over the content. DPP has also developed an application for Data Analytics that allows for a supervisor/agent to reasonably pull real time data relative to the supervision of our cases. Information tracked in Data Analytics covers various areas of supervision to include overdue assessments and reassessments, treatment referrals, case planning benchmarks, earned compliance benchmarks, and other areas of supervision. Data Analytics was developed in an effort to assist the Agent with the management of their respective workload. Additional booster training and further system enhancements to add and refine business processes not currently available would assist in achieving the goals outlined in this question. Additionally, system level reporting on the application and outcomes of the graduated sanctions matrix is already in development with the Department’s Information Technology and Communications Division (ITCD). This feature will provide, along with the Data Analytics platform, sufficient information for measuring compliance, defined by response to intervention. Further enhancements to Data Analytics would require additional funding. We do not believe the data should be used by the Department to help predict victimization. In keeping with existing policy governing data usage, the Department has previously partnered with expert research entities and non-profit
programs seeking to use data to improve intervention of vulnerable justice-involved populations, and will continue to do so to the benefit of its population.

**Observation 4:** DPP failed to follow their own after-action policy in a majority of the cases involving murder victims and suspects observed during this scoping evaluation.

**Response:** The Department agrees.

After a review of the 66 cases identified by OPEGA that were victims or suspects from January 1, 2020 through February 29, 2020 in Baltimore City, we determined that there were 65 cases where the event occurred between the time period identified in the study. One case was accidentally identified as January 30, 2020, when the incident was actually December 30, 2019. A review of the case notes reveals that on December 30, 2019, the CIT template was initiated and entered into OCMS the same day by the Intelligence Unit Liaison. The CIT was subsequently completed and entered by the field on the same date. This particular case thus falls outside of the scope of the audit as it occurred prior to the months reviewed.

The 65 remaining cases break down as follows:

- 12 homicide suspects;
- 21 homicide victims;
- 5 NFS suspects; and
- 27 NFS victims.

Of the 65 CIT’s:

- 47 were entered in OCMS within the mandated 1 work day;
- 9 were entered late;
- 9 were missing from OCMS; and
- 3 of the missing have been completed on 08/28/20.

One of these cases that was lacking a CIT had no CIT template entered into case notes by the Intelligence Unit Liaison. According to case notes, the Agent was informed of the subject's death from a phone call from the "child's mother."

Another one of these cases that was lacking a CIT received notification from the Intelligence Unit Liaison on 2/18/20. A later entry noted that the case had reached its maximum expiration date on 2/17/20.

Of the 33 homicide suspects or victims requiring a CIA:

- 4 were completed and entered within the mandated 10 working days;
- 8 were entered into OCMS past the mandated 10 working days;
- 4 were completed on paper and staffed, but were not uploaded into OCMS; and
17 were not entered into OCMS.

Of the cases not entered into OCMS:

5 were entered into OCMS on 08/27/20; and
2 were entered into OCMS on 08/28/20.

The Regional Office is improving their tracking mechanism of ensuring that the CIT’s and CIA’s are completed within policy. Currently, all CIT’s and CIA’s are up to date.

**Recommendation 4:** Regulations should be established which mandate after-action review for those incidents where an individual under DPP supervision is involved in a murder or non-fatal shooting. Furthermore, DPP should report annually to the Maryland General Assembly on the findings of their after-action policy.

**Response:** The Department agrees in part and disagrees in part.

The DPP policy mandates that completing a “Critical Incident Analysis” template is completed no later than ten workdays after a “Critical Incident Tracking” template is completed. A CIA is required without omissions by an agent or field supervisor, and inserted into the DPP Case Notes System Supervision Notes field for the involved offender. The Regional Leadership team reviews the CIA, and the Regional Administrator ensures that the template is forwarded to the Executive Deputy Director for Operations.

DPP agrees with the recommendation that “regulations should be established which mandate after-action review for those incidents where an individual under DPP supervision is involved in a murder or non-fatal shooting”. In fact, DPP already has an applicable policy in place, General Order No. 09-006 Intelligence Unit Liaisons and Critical Incident Tracking and Analysis. DPP does admit to not ensuring the timeliness of the tracking of the critical incidents and analysis in the Baltimore Metro Region. Steps have been put into place to ensure that this is done timely, to be in compliance with the policy. In addition, the policy stipulates embedded intelligence analysts within the BPD War Room help make connections between the active community supervision population and the identified victims and suspects of non-fatal shootings and homicides.

Intelligence Liaisons are proactive in communicating with the BPD and the DPP agents in obtaining information on high risk individuals who are under supervision that are suspected in committing crimes within Baltimore City and other areas of the state. Addresses, phone numbers, photos and other information that is needed by BPD is provided. Intelligence Liaisons and Agents have worked closely together in arranging to make a client available who is a suspect for apprehension. Agents will contact the Intelligence Liaisons to notify them if they suspect criminal activities being carried out by clients under supervision. In addition, violation warrants have
been requested to assist the BPD in regards to obtaining information on clients that are suspected of committing serious crimes within Baltimore City communities. It should also be noted that home visits are conducted with law enforcement officers, and agents have had clients report in to see them at BPD police districts.

The regulations should be codified in the Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR), making the process transparent to the public. Further, DPP does not offer comment on the causality of victimization within its supervision population and does not consider the case closure by death to be a mark of noncompliance, as that would assign criminal culpability to victims for a perpetrator’s behavior. Compliance as reported above is reflective of supervision status, qualitative review of case documents, and the terms of supervision.
In regards to the Background section on page 3 of the final report, the Department offers the following comments:

DPP supervises clients placed on supervision by the courts – probationers, paroled by the Maryland Parole Commission (MPC) – parolees, and released by the Division of Corrections – mandatory releases. In addition, for certain clients under the Drinking Driver Monitor Program (DDMP), clients are referred by the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration. The State of Maryland is a member of the Interstate Commission for Adult Offenders, “Developed in 1937 and designed to regulate the movement of probationers and parolees across state lines, the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS) is enacted in all 50 states and three U.S. territories (District of Columbia, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico). Revised in 2002, the compact provides states the authority, accountability, and resources to track the supervision of offenders who move across state lines, thereby enhancing public safety and offender accountability. ICAOS has become a powerful and adaptive tool for promoting and ensuring cooperative action among the states and a single standard of supervision for offenders.” In addition to supervising individuals in the communities of Maryland, DPP conducts certain investigations other than the Pre-Sentence Investigation. For example, DPP conducts Pre-Trial, Post-Sentence, Pre-Parole, Pre-Parole – Life Sentence, Special Court, Special Divisional, Home and Employment, Interstate Home and Employment, Executive Clemency and Applicant Employment Investigation Assistance investigations (as needed by HRSD). Also, DPP has the authority to collect payment obligations. The payment obligations and corresponding Maryland Annotated Code authority includes: probation, parole and mandatory supervision fees, drug and/or alcohol testing fees, restitution, court costs, fines, DDMP fees and a 2% collection fee on all restitution.

Supervision level definitions are as follows:

- VPI- Violence Prevention Initiative;
- HGH- High Supervision Level;
- MOD- Moderate Supervision Level;
- LMD- Low Moderate Supervision Level;
- LOW- Low Supervision Level;
- REV- Review;
- SO1- Level 1 Sexual Offenders;
SO2- Level 2 Sexual Offenders;

SO3- Level 3 Sexual Offenders; and

SO4- Level 4 Sexual Offenders.

The Review (REV) supervision level is not a static level of supervision. REV is the initial supervision level for all non-sexual offenders or Violence Prevention Initiative (VPI) eligible clients. This is the initial period of time (within the first 45 days of supervision) in which a supervising agent is performing all of the necessary risk/needs assessments to determine the appropriate level of supervision. The levels of supervision are indicative of the risk/needs factors involved with High (HGH) being the highest risk and progressively moving downward to LOW, which are the lowest risk offenders. As offenders are compliant with supervision and addressing the areas of their lives, which were problematic, they are rewarded with being supervised less intensely. Agents perform periodic reassessments, which reviews individuals’ compliance while under supervision. As individuals are compliant, they will move down in supervision intensity. Low (LOW) is the Division’s lowest supervision level. The LOW level of supervision is reserved for lowest risk clients and those who have exhibited significant compliance, earning a downgrade into the supervision lowest level. Sexual Offenders are also supervised based on risk/needs; Level 1 represents the highest risk, and then progressively moving downward to Level 4, which represents the lowest risk level.

The Baltimore/Metro Region supervises several specialized caseloads, to include Mental Health Court, Domestic Violence Unit (FAST East & West), Veterans Court, Drug Treatment Court in both District and Circuit Court, District Court Re-Entry Project (DCREP), Aim to B’More (Baltimore City State's Attorney’s Office Diversion Program for first-time felony drug offenders), Reentry caseloads, and 8-507 (in collaboration with the Department of Health). These populations are all unique to Baltimore City. Due to the complexity and acuity of offenders assigned to these specialized caseloads, as well as program requirements, DPP strives to keep those caseload averages below 50 cases per agent.

By not including the full spectrum of duties as noted in the Background, the description does not accurately encompass all of the important work done by DPP public safety professionals.

In regards to the Justice Reinvestment Act section on page 4 of the final report, the Department offers the following comments:

On October 1, 2017, DPP began full operation of the community supervision aspects of the JRA. While those two outcomes are significant, the JRA had a larger systemic impact on the culture and processes of DPP. The adoption of the LSI-R tool and the revalidation of its other screeners were significant steps toward an evidence-based
standard of interventions in Maryland. DPP spent a full year working with its federal technical assistance provider, the Crime and Justice Institute, to coordinate months of training, planning, and validation of the LSI-R tool, including follow-up inter-rater reliability training in its screening tools, to ensure staff were appropriately and consistently using it to assess risk and criminogenic needs. The LSI-R tool identifies client needs that impact both criminogenic behavior and compliance success, enabling agents to address core needs. The LSI-R is widely used in community supervision settings and is a very comprehensive third-generation risk screener that takes into account current attitudes, family and community relationships, substance abuse, and post-sentence community adjustment. The reliance on a validated risk and needs assessment affords the DPP agent an opportunity to formulate a more appropriate, individualized case plan based on priority criminogenic factors, as opposed to subjective judicially imposed special conditions that are not uniform or evidence-based. Full implementation of the JRA also required the development of a formal process for imposing sanctions prior to violation requests for technical violations. The essential focus of this matrix was to meet the challenges of clients with constructive and proportionate responses, reserving revocation, especially extended revocation, for only more serious levels of noncompliance that impact public safety. The formulation of the sanctioning process included due process provisions for individuals to contest and appeal graduated sanctions that did not exist in DPP prior to the JRA. Additionally, the JRA afforded clients under DPP supervision the opportunity to complete their supervised release prior to expiration by earning compliance credits (ECC), the opportunity to earn a certificate of compliance, and paying restitution while incarcerated prior to release on probation, for pending split sentences. These reforms are aimed at reducing the length of time under supervision and likelihood of re-offense, which are linked to improved public safety outcomes.

The JRA Restitution component also impacted DPP in regards to collecting and posting payments from inmates sentenced to a period of incarceration with community supervision following release. This process allows DPP to collect restitution owed to victims from inmates earlier and allows payments to be disbursed to victims much sooner rather than upon release. Earlier collection of restitution places a higher focus on restorative justice and can reduce the length of supervision due to unsatisfied restitution payments. To accomplish the restitution collection component, the Department has and will continue to work closely with local detention centers in maintaining mechanisms to collect and disperse restitution payments. Accelerated restitution payment is just one of the focus areas where JRA brought about a higher focus for the needs of crime victims into the Department’s practice.

The Department urged OPEGA to read the full text of Chapter 515 of 2016 to familiarize itself with all of the impacts of the law on the Department’s operations.
In regards to the DPP Intake and Screening Process section starting on page 5 of the final report, the Department offers the following comments:

At intake, a reviewer screens all individuals for specialized populations such as sex offender supervision, domestic violence (DV) supervision, VPI, interstate supervision, drug treatment court as well as other specialized populations in Baltimore City. If individuals score yes to all three questions, they are placed in VPI regardless of the outcome of the Initial Risk Screener. At the time of intake, age is the only determining factor whether or not a person is screened for VPI supervision. The Initial Risk Screening tool is used to quickly identify our lowest risk individuals, while simultaneously identifying those who will require the LSI-R assessment to determine final supervision level. The Initial Risk Screener is conducted at the time of intake, not within 10 days from the time of intake. Any sexual offender’s final supervision levels are determined by a separate assessment tool specially designed to measure re-offense factors among sex offenders.

We review the persons order for specialized populations such as sex offender, VPI, interstate supervision, DV supervision, and drug court. If the supervisee is 30 or under he gets a VPI screener. If the result is yes, and the person is not a sex offender, he is referred to VPI. If the person is not VPI, then he gets the Initial Risk Screener, which determines whether or not the individual is LOW. If he is not LOW as a result of the Initial Risk Screener, he gets an LSI-R, which will determine the final risk level. It must be noted that the LSI-R is more involved than just a series of questions. Depending on the answers to the questions and information gathered, there is probing that takes place by the agent utilizing the tools of motivational interviewing. In preparation for the LSI-R interview, the agent must perform several duties to gain additional background information on the client. The supervising agent must review the individual’s criminal justice history, to include as applicable: arrests, convictions, criminal charges, driving record, offense reports and statements of charges, pre-sentence investigation reports, jail and prison records, previous monitoring, supervision terms and outcomes, speaking with collateral sources such as the individual’s significant other, family, associates, as well as previous agents and monitors. This additional background information is key to performing a quality interview in order to develop an accurate score.

It should also be noted that the validation of the risk needs screeners assessment was completed by George Mason University in June 2018. Therefore, the revalidation study should be completed in late June of 2021.

In regards to the Conclusion section on pages 23 and 24 of the final report, the Department offers the following comments:

DPP will always cooperate with any study OPEGA conducts, but we feel it is important to also provide some additional information about the various potential study areas referenced in this section of the report, and then further discuss with OPEGA at some point.
DPP is always striving to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of OCMS as a case management system. DPP began utilizing OCMS as a case management system on December 10, 2012, and since that time consistent upgrades and additions have been added to the system. For example, some additions include graduated sanctions, earned compliance credit tracking, automated risk needs instruments, Data Analytics and most recently the supervision reporting, which no longer requires the agent to utilize a separate system. It should also be noted that enhancements that are needed to OCMS are added when funding is available.

DPP places a high value on electronic monitoring by utilizing it for our home detention population, sex offenders and high risk offenders. Crimes of homicides and non-fatal shootings have been solved due to the use of electronic monitoring. It is very valuable when supervising our sex offenders who have exclusionary zones and our high risk individuals who pose a risk to public safety. The Division works closely with law enforcement for high risk individuals, and electronic monitoring is a valuable tool that is shared with law enforcement.

DPP believes that the Pre-Sentence Investigations are effective in getting a full background for the individual that is going to be sentenced. It assists the courts in making sentencing decisions and assists in imposing special conditions. In addition, it is a valuable tool for placement of individuals in a correctional setting. We believe one area that does need to be evaluated is the sentencing guidelines and the application of them by the sentencing jurisdictions.

The JRA mandates that risk/needs assessments are validated every three years. By having revalidation on a regular basis, the Department has the confidence that the risk/needs instruments are evidence based and effective in assisting with identifying criminogenic needs when creating case plans. Identifying criminogenic factors and developing appropriate case plans leads to a reduction in recidivism.

DPP is interdependent on other state and local agencies as well as community partners to ascertain resources in response to supervisee needs such as job training and employment, educational resources, family planning and parenting skills, treatment needs, financial planning, housing, and other services.

DPP believes that graduated sanctions are effective in supervision. By utilizing graduated sanctions, it ensures that supervision is not revoked for technical violations that do not create a public safety risk. In addition, it improves supervision outcomes with satisfactory closures.

DPP believes that there is use and value in enhanced supervision and collaboration between DPP and relevant public safety agencies with respect to individuals convicted or charged with violent crimes. DPP Agents do not have law enforcement powers to affect arrest or warrant issuance, and rely on partnerships with the two primary law enforcement entities in Baltimore City: the BPD and the Baltimore City State’s
Attorney’s Office. Embedded intelligence analysts within the BPD War Room help make connections between the active community supervision population and the identified victims and suspects of non-fatal shootings and homicides.

DPP believes that it is very important that its supervisees are in compliance with all conditions imposed. DPP also attempts to implement best practices to improve compliance, and tries to ensure the efficacy of reporting technical violations. Through collaboration with the BPD and the Baltimore City State’s Attorney Office, we are able to assist in identifying suspects under supervision for serious violent offenses, and positively affect requests for warrants for high risk individuals who are involved in violent crime.